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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Wickersham Commission, the first national crime commission in 
American history, has never received much attention in biographies of 
President Herbert Hoover or histories of his presidential 
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administration.1  In many respects, this is understandable.  Only one of 
the fourteen reports of the Commission gained any significant public 
attention when it was published, which was mainly because of its 
perceived failure, while three others had some long-term impact on 
public policy that was subtle and difficult to pinpoint conclusively.  
Accounts of Hoover’s presidency have understandably been dominated 
by the economic calamity of the Great Depression that struck only 
months after he was sworn into office.2  Hoover himself assigned little 
significance to the Wickersham Commission in his later years.  In his 
three-volume Memoirs he devotes exactly a page and a half to it, and his 
comments are confined to the issue of prohibition.3 
Nonetheless, the Wickersham Commission, officially the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,4 deserves serious 
attention, as it amplifies important themes in Hoover’s life and work 
and occupies an important place in the history of American criminal 
justice.  With regard to Hoover this Article argues that the Wickersham 
Commission was fully consistent with his public career before and 
during his presidency and his belief in the need for facts to guide public 
policy making.  With regard to criminal justice, the Wickersham 
Commission is a link between the neglected but important crime 
commission movement in the 1920s and subsequent crime commissions 
from the late 1930s to the 1960s.5 
This Article has two goals.  First, it seeks to place the Wickersham 
Commission in the context of Herbert Hoover’s life and work.  Second, 
it seeks to place the Commission in the context of criminal justice 
reform and the history of national crime commissions.  Section II 
discusses how Hoover’s public life was guided by his training as an 
 
1. The exception is James D. Calder’s book on Herbert Hoover.  See JAMES D. 
CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: 
HERBERT HOOVER’S INITIATIVES (1993).  For another discussion of the Wickersham 
Commission, see  SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 154–70 (2d ed. 1998).     
2. See, e.g., MARTIN L. FAUSOLD, THE PRESIDENCY OF HERBERT C. HOOVER (1985); 
EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON & VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, HERBERT HOOVER, PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1975). 
3. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1920–1933, at 277–78 (2d ed. 1952).   
4. The official records of the Commission consist of twenty-six reels of microfilm.  
RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: 
PART 1 (1997) (containing fifteen reels); RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON 
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: PART 2 (1999) (containing eleven reels). 
5. WALKER, supra note 1, at 154, 178–79.   
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engineer, his political ideology as a moderate Republican progressive, 
and to a limited extent, his religious background as a Quaker.  Section 
III examines Herbert Hoover’s pre-presidential career and argues that 
the Wickersham Commission was a natural extension of his political 
views and actions as a public official.  Section IV covers selected aspects 
of Hoover’s presidency other than the Wickersham Commission by 
establishing the connection between his reform ambitions as President 
and the Commission.  Section V first examines the crime commission 
movement of the 1920s, which set a precedent for the Wickersham 
Commission, and second examines the more important Commission 
reports that have lasting relevance.  Section VI gives brief attention to 
the various post-Wickersham crime commissions and their relationship 
to the Wickersham Commission.  Section VII offers a brief comment on 
the Hoover Commission, Hoover’s last important contribution as a 
public servant. 
II. HERBERT HOOVER: ENGINEER AND PROGRESSIVE6 
There is an arc to the life and work of Herbert Hoover, marked by a 
strong consistency with regard to his professional training as an engineer 
and the political ideology that shaped his career as a public servant.  The 
Wickersham Commission links his pre-presidential achievements, his 
efforts at domestic reform while President (apart from the Depression 
and his response to it), and his one major activity in his post-presidential 
years.7  In all of his public activities, Hoover was the consummate 
engineer, dedicated to problem solving through practical solutions based 
on a careful study of the facts.  As both Secretary of Commerce and as 
President he sponsored numerous commissions and conferences 
addressing particular social and economic needs.  His commitment was 
always “investigation before action.”8 
Politically, Hoover was a moderate Republican and political 
progressive, arguably the last of that breed to hold major political 
 
6. The phrase “The Engineer as Progressive” is the title of Chapter II of JOAN HOFF 
WILSON, HERBERT HOOVER: FORGOTTEN PROGRESSIVE 31–53 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1975), 
and is the source of the interpretation of Hoover in this Article. 
7. See THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT v–vi (1949) [hereinafter REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH]. 
8. See RAY LYMAN WILBUR & ARTHUR MASTICK HYDE, THE HOOVER POLICIES 41 
(1937).  
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office.9  Biographer David Burner summed up Hoover’s combination of 
engineering and progressivism as “technical proficiency, turned to 
humane needs.”10  Historian Joan Hoff Wilson aptly subtitled her short 
but insightful biography of Hoover, “Forgotten Progressive.”11  He 
resembled the two famous progressive presidents, Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson, in that he believed in the promise of America for 
the individual and for business enterprise.  None of the three presidents 
was a radical who challenged the fundamental institutions of society and 
the underlying values of individualism and the free enterprise system.  
Their goal was to eliminate obstacles to progress, particularly the trusts, 
political machines, and inhumane working conditions.  Biographers have 
also detected the influence Hoover’s Quaker background had 
throughout his career, in his humanitarian undertakings in World War I, 
his long concern for child welfare, and his broader emphasis on 
voluntary cooperation rather than government coercion.12  Hoover’s 
short 1922 political testament, American Individualism, was a 
thoroughly conventional political tract, expressing pieties about 
individualism, social and economic progress, and small government.  As 
this Article will argue, however, it did not truly reflect his policies as 
Secretary of Commerce or as President where he pursued an activist, 
albeit limited, role for government.13 Although Hoover is commonly 
linked with his two Republican predecessors, Warren G. Harding and 
Calvin Coolidge, as President, he rejected their vision of a small and 
passive federal government in favor of government activism.  The 
standard cliché about the Republican Party being beholden to laissez-
faire economic policies applies to his predecessors but not at all to 
Hoover.  In fact, Hoover was not entirely certain which party he would 
commit to in the 1920 presidential election until late March of that 
year.14 
 
9. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 73–76.   
10. DAVID BURNER, HERBERT HOOVER: A PUBLIC LIFE 212 (1978).  
11. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6. 
12. See, e.g., BURNER, supra note 10, at 8–9, 212–14; DAVID HINSHAW, HERBERT 
HOOVER: AMERICAN QUAKER 34–58 (1950).  
13. See GARY DEAN BEST, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: HERBERT 
HOOVER IN TRANSITION, 1918–1921, at 91–94 (1975).  See generally HERBERT HOOVER, 
AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM (1922).  
14. BURNER, supra note 10, at 150–52. 
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III. HOOVER’S PRE-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS 
In his pre-presidential years, Herbert Hoover was one of the great 
success stories in American public life, as he achieved success and public 
renown in every venture.15  Before entering public life he was a highly 
successful professional engineer, achieving significant financial wealth 
and establishing a reputation as an extremely capable executive.  In 
early 1920 he was briefly considered as a possible candidate for 
President, and was even considered a possibility by some leading 
Democrats.16 
A. The World War I Years 
Engaged in international engineering enterprises, Hoover was living 
in London in August 1914 when World War I broke out.17  Americans 
living in England, along with tourists and others who fled the continent, 
found themselves stranded and in many cases without financial 
resources.  To provide assistance, and at the request of the British 
government, the American embassy created the Committee of 
American Residents in London for Assistance of American Travelers, 
with Hoover as chair.18  The project was a great success and helped 
provide short-term financial help to stranded Americans and eventually 
arranged the return to the United States of an estimated 100,000 
people.19  With this effort, Hoover’s career as a private businessman 
ended and his career as a public servant began.20  
The success of the stranded Americans effort led the American 
Ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page, to ask Hoover to chair the 
Committee for Relief in Belgium (CRB).21  Famine among the Belgian 
and French people under German occupation was a major crisis, and in 
the United States their suffering became one of the major items in the 
 
15. See generally 2 GEORGE H. NASH, THE LIFE OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE 
HUMANITARIAN 1914–1917 (1988) [hereinafter 2 NASH]; 3 GEORGE H. NASH, THE LIFE OF 
HERBERT HOOVER: MASTER OF EMERGENCIES 1917–1918 (1996) [hereinafter 3 NASH].   
16. BURNER, supra note 10, at 151. 
17. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 4. 
18. Id. at 4, 7.  
19. See id. at 12. 
20. Id. at 14.  More information can be found in the first three volumes of a four volume 
series which is devoted entirely to Hoover’s World War I relief efforts.  See generally 1 
HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN EPIC (1959); 2 HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN 
EPIC (1960); 3 HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN EPIC (1961). 
21. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 32. 
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government’s propaganda campaign of demonizing Germany.22  Under 
Hoover’s leadership, which included not just coping with the logistics of 
food transport but also navigating complex political conflicts among the 
Allies, the CRB was extremely successful.  The committee oversaw the 
delivery of 2.5 million tons of food, which fed an estimated 9 million 
people.23 
On the basis of his two successes in England, when the United States 
entered the European war in August 1917, President Woodrow Wilson 
asked Hoover to head the U.S. Food Administration.24  This was a major 
undertaking as the American economy almost ground to a halt under 
the demands of mobilizing the country for the national war effort.25  
Mobilizing for an international war was the first truly national 
emergency since the United States had spread across the continent and 
been transformed by industrialization.  The country had no prior 
experience and the then very small federal government was completely 
unequipped for the challenge.  The effort included drafting, training, 
and feeding an army; getting that force to Europe; coordinating 
agricultural and industrial production; mobilizing public opinion 
through a propaganda effort;26 and suppressing virtually all dissent.27  By 
the end of 1917, severe food and fuel shortages existed in many cities.28  
Congress had responded in August 1917 by giving President Wilson 
extraordinary power over the economy, including all aspects of the food 
industry with the Lever Act (officially the Food and Fuel Conservation 
Act).29 
Hoover accepted Wilson’s offer (there is evidence that he actually 
eagerly sought the position), declined a salary, and as with every venture 
in his life, he took complete charge of the situation.30  While the Lever 
Act granted the administration extraordinary power, Hoover chose to 
exercise it largely indirectly, preferring a policy of voluntary 
 
22. See GEORGE CREEL, HOW WE ADVERTISED AMERICA: THE FIRST TELLING OF 
THE AMAZING STORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION THAT CARRIED THE 
GOSPEL OF AMERICANISM TO EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE 420–21 (1920). 
23. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 362. 
24. See 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 71–72. 
25. Id. 
26. See generally CREEL, supra note 22. 
27. See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 51–53 (1979).  
28. 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 219–20. 
29. Id. at 71–72. 
30. Id. at 21, 35. 
15 WALKER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:11 AM 
2013] THE ENGINEER AS PROGRESSIVE 1171 
cooperation.  With a combination of exhortation and the threat of 
penalties, Hoover managed food production and distribution through 
voluntary trade associations that managed prices.  The public 
exhortation effort was considerable, as Hoover aggressively promoted 
the slogan “Food will win the war.”31 
His record as head of the Food Administration was almost 
universally regarded as an enormous success.  The war ended in 
November 1918 with Hoover enjoying a reputation as one of the heroes 
of the war effort, an enormously capable public official, and a promising 
political future.  Although reluctantly, he allowed a committee to work 
for his nomination as the Republican candidate for President in 1920, 
while some prominent Democrats seriously considered him as their 
nominee.32 
B. Hoover as Secretary of Commerce 
Hoover served eight years as Secretary of Commerce under 
Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge.  In that position he 
promoted an activist role for the government that was out of step with 
the presidents he served and the reputation of the Republican Party in 
the 1920s as beholden to a laissez-faire policy on the role of government 
and the economy.  His many commissions, conferences, and task forces 
addressing problems that inhibited social and economic progress clearly 
marked him as a progressive and not a conservative.  Historian Hoff 
Wilson characterizes his role as Secretary of Commerce as “Domestic 
Dynamo,”33 and one political cartoon depicted a “traffic problem” in the 
nation’s capital caused by a parade of Hoover’s many commissions.34 
Hoover departed from 1920s Republican orthodoxy on several 
issues.  Most notably, when asked by President Harding to be Secretary 
of Commerce, Hoover insisted on having “a voice on major policies 
involving labor,” believing that “commerce and industry could [not] 
make progress unless labor advanced with them.”35  (This was a reason 
many conservative Republicans opposed his nomination.)36  He 
supported passage of the 1926 Railway Labor Act, a forerunner of the 
 
31. BURNER, supra note 10, at 102; 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 153. 
32. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 73–78. 
33. See generally id. at 79–121.   
34. Id. at 119. 
35. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 94–95; HOOVER, supra note 3, at 101. 
36. Hoover’s nomination as Secretary of Commerce was opposed by many conservative 
Republicans.  HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 79–80. 
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1935 National Labor Relations Act (known popularly as the Wagner 
Act), as a means of providing orderly resolution of labor disputes.37  His 
many articles and speeches while Secretary covered the business-related 
subjects one would expect of a Secretary of Commerce, but Hoover also 
gave considerable attention to social problems such as home ownership, 
education, the welfare of children, illiteracy, and the status of African-
Americans. 
His concern for the welfare of children was particularly notable.  In 
1920, even before entering the Cabinet, he was active in child welfare 
issues; for example, he consolidated several private agencies into the 
American Child Welfare Association, of which he was president.38  In 
his memoirs he devoted a short chapter to “Better Children,” covering 
his activities in this area while Secretary of Commerce.39  He proclaimed 
May Day in 1923 to be Children’s Health and Protection Day and 
repeated the proclamation annually while President.40  Two years later 
he suggested a Bill of Rights for Children.41  This novel idea anticipated 
the children’s rights movement of the late 1960s by four decades.42 
On other social issues one of Hoover’s greatest achievements as 
Secretary of Commerce was in handling relief for the victims of the 1927 
Mississippi Flood, which still stands as one of the greatest natural 
disasters to strike the United States.  The flood inundated an estimated 
16,570,627 acres in seven states, displaced an estimated 325,000 persons, 
and killed between 250 and 500 people.43  The federal government was 
 
37. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER 1920–1933, at 215–16, 272–73 (1960).  In fact, however, the decade of the 1920s 
witnessed a devastating decline in unionism, as the federal courts willingly granted injunctions 
that prohibited virtually all forms of union organizing.  See id. at 190, 195–96.  Hoover’s 
efforts at cooperation and conciliation had little impact on the broader trend of events.  See 
id. at 252.  
38. HOOVER, supra note 3, at 97. 
39. See generally id. at 97–100.  A guide to the papers from Hoover’s Commerce 
Department years is available at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.  The Papers of 
Herbert Hoover, available at http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/hooverpapers/ho
over/commerce/hcomsubj.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
40. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 55. 
41. Id. at 55–56. 
42. As President, Hoover expressed some concern about certain civil liberties issues, 
notably the status of persons still in prison for World War I violations of the Espionage Act, 
but he never articulated these concerns publicly and never took any bold action on them.  See 
SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON TO OBAMA: A STORY 
OF POOR CUSTODIANS 52, 62 (2012). 
43. PETE DANIEL, DEEP’N AS IT COME: THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOOD 10 (1977).  
Unfortunately, there are wildly varying estimates on numbers of acres flooded, 
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very small in those years and had essentially no institutional capacity for 
responding to a disaster of such proportions.44  President Coolidge asked 
Hoover to coordinate relief efforts, with the Red Cross serving as the 
principal agency.45  In addition to public appeals that raised millions of 
dollars, Hoover was able to generate several millions more in federal 
assistance.46  This represented a significant departure from orthodox 
Republican policy of limited government in the decade.  He also played 
a major role in designing and supporting the 1928 Mississippi Flood 
Control Bill that gave the federal government responsibility for 
rebuilding levees and preventing floods.47  The law more closely 
resembled the New Deal rather than 1920s Republicanism.48  His only 
misstep in the flood relief effort was his attempt to cover up widespread 
discrimination against African-Americans among flood victims.  He 
created the Colored Advisory Commission to advise him on the matter, 
but when its report confirmed the worst allegations he persuaded its 
chair not to publicize it, promising to aid African-Americans once he 
was President.  He failed to follow through on that promise and 
alienated African-American leaders as a result.49 
IV. HOOVER AS PRESIDENT 
As President, Hoover continued the pattern he had established as 
 
displaced  persons, and deaths.  See, e.g., Stephen Ambrose, Great Flood, 
NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC.COM (May 1, 2001), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/
05/0501_river4.html (“Twenty-seven thousand square miles were inundated.  This was about 
equal to the combined size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont.  
By July 1, even as the flood began to recede, 1.5 million acres were under water.”); 
Mississippi    River    Flood    of    1927,    BRITANNICA.COM,    http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/1481633/Mississippi-River-flood-of-1927 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (“More than 
23,000 square miles (60,000 square km) of land was submerged, hundreds of thousands of 
people were displaced, and around 250 people died.”).  These disparities are, at least in part, 
because of the evolving nature of the river, and flood basin, and the inability to accurately 
determine all flooding at one point in time. 
44. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND 
HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 371–72 (1997).  
45. Id. at 240–41. 
46. Id. at 367, 369.   
47. See id. at 401–07.  
48. Id. at 407; DANIEL, supra note 43, at 150 (explaining the details of the law). 
49. See DONALD J. LISIO, HOOVER, BLACKS, & LILY-WHITES: A STUDY OF SOUTHERN 
STRATEGIES 6–7, 14, 70–71 (1985).  Hoover did not mention this embarrassing aspect of the 
Mississippi flood story in his 1952 Memoirs.  See generally HOOVER, supra note 3, at 125–31.  
Although there is some metion in the memoir, there are no entries in the Index to “negroes” 
or “race” in this volume of his Memoirs.  Id. at 518–19.  
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Secretary of Commerce by creating a seemingly endless array of 
commissions and conferences.  His responsibilities as President, in fact, 
only gave him a wider field for such activities.  Nine months into his 
presidency he jokingly told an audience, “[y]ou have been misled into 
the impression that I shall soon appoint [a commission] every day.  That 
is wrong—I shall probably need to appoint two a day.”50  One historian 
counted thirty presidential sponsored conferences and commissions by 
mid-1932; another historian estimated there were 3,000 conferences on 
various issues during Hoover’s twelve years as Secretary of Commerce 
and President.51  Biographer David Burner titles his first chapter on 
Hoover as President “The Reform Presidency”; in the months before 
the Depression overtook the country his presidency represented “a 
remarkable experiment in developing new approaches to old 
problems.”52  In the context of this active engagement with social 
problems, the Wickersham Commission was simply business as usual for 
the Hoover Administration. 
The range of issues covered clearly refutes any suggestion that he 
was a business-oriented Republican committed to laissez-faire ideology.  
Instead, the issues mark him as a progressive, more in tune with the 
concerns of the Democratic Party presidents who preceded and 
followed him as President, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.53  A sampling of these efforts include the President’s 
Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti (1929–
1930), the President’s Committee on the Conservation and 
Administration of the Public Domain (1929–1933), the Advisory 
Committee on Education; the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics; the White House Conference on Home Building and 
Ownership; the Child Health & Protection Conference; the Conference 
on the Crisis in Education (1932) (which prompted Hoover to 
considered creating a Department of Education); a National Advisory 
Council on Illiteracy; and more.54 
 
50. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 41. 
51. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 82.  The claim of 3,000 events is not documented in 
specific detail. 
52. BURNER, supra note 10, at 212. 
53. See generally WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8 (providing the best overview of the 
scope of Hoover’s reform activities).  Materials on the various reform activities are available 
at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.  Historical Materials, 
HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, www.ecommcode2.com/hoove
r/research/historicalmaterials/hmfed.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
54. See The Herbert Hoover Papers, HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND 
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Hoover’s concern with the welfare of children, which was strong 
while he was Secretary of Commerce, continued through his presidency.  
He spoke and wrote every year on the subject, and annually he 
proclaimed May 1st as Children’s Health and Protection Day.55  For the 
White House Conference on Children in late 193056 he translated his 
earlier idea of a Children’s Bill of Rights into a “Children’s Charter.”57  
Truly remarkable for its time, it called for a right to “parental, natal and 
postnatal care” for mothers, “periodic health examinations” and dental 
care for “every child”; diagnosis and training for disabled children, and 
an “adequate standard of living” for all families.58  The proposal 
anticipated by four decades the idea of children’s rights and was radical 
even by later standards. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and academically weighty 
commission report was Recent Social Trends in the United States 
(1933),59 which involved contributions from many of the nation’s leading 
social scientists, was accompanied by thirteen separate monographs, 
and, in twenty-nine chapters, covered virtually every important area of 
American life.60  The report was evidently very well received and went 
through several printings in the first seven months.61  One suspects, 
however, that the report had more impact among academics, who found 
it a valuable resource at the time and today use it as a historical 
benchmark on the various issues, than on immediate public policy.  
Recent Social Trends most closely resembles the Wickersham 
Commission as a detailed discussion of the topics covered. 
If Hoover sought to be a reform president, the great tragedy of his 
presidency was the Great Depression, which devastated the economy 
and shattered all his dreams of social and economic progress through 
enlightened leadership and gradual, government-encouraged reform.  
The Wickersham Commission inevitably suffered the same fate. 
 
MUSEUM, http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/hooverpapers/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
55. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 55; Hoover Proclaims Child Health Day, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1929, at 5 (Presidential Proclamation printed in the N.Y. Times with a 
foreword by Frank. B., Kellogg, Secretary of State). 
56. See generally WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 58–71. 
57. Id. at 64–67. 
58. Id. at 65–66. 
59. See 1 PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMM. ON SOC. TRENDS, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1933) [Hereinafter RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS]. 
60. Id.  
61. See id. at iv.   
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V. THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION 
Herbert Hoover turned his attention to the problem of crime and 
criminal justice from the moment he took office as President.  In his 
Inaugural Address on March 4, 1929, he declared: “Justice must not fail 
because the agencies of enforcement are either delinquent or 
inefficiently organized.  To consider these evils, to find their remedy, is 
the most sore necessity of our times.”62  He followed up with another 
comment on the need for a commission to study law enforcement at his 
first press conference the next day.63 
The Wickersham Commission reflected the principles and practices 
that characterized all of Hoover’s previous life and work.  It was simply 
one of the many commissions he appointed as Secretary of Commerce 
or President that engaged recognized experts to develop practical 
recommendations that would address inefficiencies and other problems 
in the subject under study (in this case, the administration of criminal 
justice).  As this Article argues below, the Report on Prohibition, which 
received most of the public comment upon publication, is a special case 
because the subject was quite different from all but one of the other 
commission reports—the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement. 
Before turning to the work of the Wickersham Commission itself,64 
however, it is important to set the context for its work by examining the 
crime commission movement of the 1920s. 
A. The Crime Commission Movement of the 1920s 
Not only was the Wickersham Commission fully consistent with 
Herbert Hoover’s pre-presidential career, but it was also a logical and, 
one might argue, inevitable outgrowth of the city and state-level crime 
commission movement of the 1920s.  There were innumerable studies of 
the administration of criminal justice in that decade, many of which 
were short, focused on a particular aspect of the criminal justice system, 
 
62. Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1929), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=21804.   
63. Herbert Hoover, The President’s News Conference (Mar. 5, 1929), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=21915.  At that press conference he said,  
One other question relates to the time I shall appoint the commission that I 
mentioned yesterday.  I notice it is referred to as a prohibition matter.  It is not.  It is 
a question of the whole problem of law enforcement.  I shall confer with the new 
Attorney General at an early date as to the constitution of that body. 
Id. 
64. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text.   
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and of little interest today.65  Three crime commissions, however, were 
substantial undertakings and served as models for the Wickersham 
Commission.66  The Cleveland [Ohio] Survey (1922),67 the Missouri 
Crime Survey (1926),68 and the Illinois Crime Survey (1929)69 were 
comprehensive studies of the administration of justice that employed 
recognized experts, adopted a self-conscious scientific approach, and 
produced lengthy reports with substantive conclusions and 
recommendations.70  Many of the authors of particular chapters were 
also involved in the Wickersham Commission.71  In retrospect, it seems 
almost inevitable that these city and state investigations would lead to 
suggestions for a national study of crime and criminal justice. 
Investigations of criminal justice agencies were nothing new in the 
1920s.  There had been a long history of investigations, particularly of 
the police and prisons throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.72  These earlier efforts, however, were largely politically driven 
exposés, often with an ill-disguised goal of embarrassing those in 
power.73  Many were also highly moralistic in orientation, driven by 
outrage at, for example, the failure of authorities to enforce law limiting 
 
65. See VIRGIL W. PETERSON, CRIME COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4 
(1945). 
66. The best bibliography of the crime commissions is found in NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW 
OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 258–65 (1931) [hereinafter 
REPORT ON PROSECUTION]; see also PETERSON, supra note 65 (summarizing crime 
commissions, authored by the Director of the Chicago Crime Commission).  The National 
Crime Commission of 1926–1927 focused on crime control, rather than the administration of 
justice in the manner of the major crime commissions discussed here or the Wickersham 
Commission.  See generally SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: 
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 130–31 (1977). 
67. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE 
CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
CLEVELAND, OHIO (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND].  A history of the survey is provided as well.  See id. at 655–62. 
68. JESSE W. BARRETT ET AL., THE MO. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE 
MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY (1926). 
69. THE ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929) 
[hereinafter THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY].  The Illinois Crime Survey was dominated by its 
investigation of organized crime in Chicago, which covered 272 pages and was the focus of the 
final recommendations.  See id. at xxii–xxvi, 815–1087, 1092–1100. 
70. See WALKER, supra note 1, at 132, 152–54. 
71. See, e.g., id. at 132, 154 (noting that August Vollmer participated in the Illinois Crime 
Survey and the Wickersham Commission). 
72. Id. at 127–29, 132, 134. 
73. Id. at 114. 
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the consumption of alcoholic beverages.74  The most famous 
investigation in this latter category was the 1894–1895 Lexow 
Committee investigation of the New York City Police Department,75 
which was triggered by an 1892 sermon76 by the Rev. Charles H. 
Parkhurst, a crusading Protestant minister. 
The criminal justice investigations of the 1920s broke with this 
tradition by adopting a self-conscious scientific approach that utilized 
recognized experts to gather and analyze the facts and by making 
recommendations based on those facts.77  This, of course, was an 
approach to social problems that Herbert Hoover took for granted and 
pursued throughout his public career.  The 1922 Cleveland Survey 
established the model for the best of the subsequent crime commissions.  
Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School, served as co-director with 
his law school colleague Felix Frankfurter.78  Pound was the dominant 
intellectual influence over the Cleveland Survey, writing the ninety-
three-page final chapter of the report, “Criminal Justice in the 
American City—A Summary,”79 and has been characterized as the 
dominant intellectual influence over the Wickersham Commission.80 
Most notably, the three 1920s crime commissions began to discover, 
very haltingly, aspects of the administration of justice that the 
Wickersham Commission noted, and which in the 1960s were finally 
recognized as the dominant characteristics of the process. The most 
important issue was the flow of cases through the criminal justice system 
(a term that was not conceptualized until the 1960s) and the exit of 
many cases from the system.  The Cleveland Survey noted the 
“mortality” of cases in the administration of justice.81  This judgment 
reflected the naïve assumption that most arrests should necessarily lead 
to conviction and punishment.  From this perspective, the “mortality” of 
 
74. Id. at 158. 
75. SPECIAL COMM. APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP’T OF THE CITY OF 
N.Y., REPORT (1895) (Senator Clarence Lexow chaired the committee). 
76. See CHARLES H. PARKHURST, OUR FIGHT WITH TAMMANY 8, 240–52 (1895); 
WALKER, supra note 66, at 44–45. 
77. WALKER, supra note 1, at 152. 
78. Id. 
79. See Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City—A Summary, in 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, supra note 67, at 559–650.  The chapter was similar to 
another of Pound’s books.  See generally ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA(1930).   
80. See CALDER, supra note 1, at 59–60 (discussing the roles of Pound and Frankfurter). 
81. See FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at 89–96. 
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cases suggested serious inefficiencies or other obstacles that needed to 
be identified and corrected.  The Illinois Crime Survey, meanwhile, 
noted that, on average, out of 100 arrests, only 15 defendants were 
sentenced to prison.82  The Wickersham Commission Report on 
Prosecution would also note these phenomena.  As is argued later in the 
Article, the crime commissions of the period were groping toward a 
recognition of the administration of justice as a “criminal justice system” 
in which a variety of organizational and legal factors affected the 
progress of cases through that system. 
We now turn our attention to the various Wickersham Commission 
reports, which vary considerably in terms of their subject, political 
implications, and relevance for future criminal justice studies.  The 
majority of the reports followed the model of the earlier crime 
commissions, addressing administrative problems that affected the 
efficiency of various agencies.  The Report on Prohibition was unique in 
addressing what was essentially a political question.  The Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement was unique in bringing a forceful civil 
liberties perspective to the subject at hand.  Finally, the Report on 
Prosecution touched on issues that would become part of the 
conventional wisdom in criminal justice studies in the 1960s. 
B. The Wickersham Commission Reports 
1. The Report on Prohibition 
Of all the Wickersham Commission reports, the Report on 
Prohibition received most of the public attention, mainly because it 
failed to recommend repeal of Prohibition.  The report actually consists 
of two documents, the Preliminary Report on Observance and 
Enforcement of Prohibition and the Report on the Enforcement of the 
Prohibition Laws of the United States.83  Prohibition had become 
increasingly unpopular by the late 1920s and was seen as not only a 
failure with respect to controlling alcohol consumption but also as the 
source of several serious problems, including: pervasive non-compliance 
by ordinary citizens who wanted to drink; loss of public confidence in 
 
82. See THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 69, at 295. 
83. The two documents were formally Reports No. 1 and No. 2 of the Commission.  See 
H.R. DOC. NO. 71-252, at 5–12 (1930) (PRELIMINARY REPORT ON OBSERVANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION); H.R. DOC. NO. 71-722 (1931) [hereinafter PROHIBITION 
ENFORCEMENT REPORT] (Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United 
States). 
15 WALKER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:11 AM 
1180 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1165 
the law and criminal justice system; the corruption of law enforcement 
agencies; abuses in enforcement of the law; and the growth of organized 
crime, which delivered the alcohol that the public clearly wanted.84  
Many critics noted the glaring contradiction between the Commission’s 
evidence on the failure of both observance of Prohibition and 
enforcement of the law and the report’s recommendations.85 
The Report on Prohibition was unequivocal in its defense of 
Prohibition, declaring that “[t]he Commission is opposed to repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment.”86  Recommendation seven conceded that 
“there is yet no adequate observance or enforcement,” and this was 
followed by a series of recommendations seeking to improve the 
effectiveness of enforcement.87  The report addressed the civil liberties 
violations associated with enforcement only by opposing any “legislation 
allowing more latitude for federal searches and seizures.”88  In this 
respect the report was in sharp contrast with the Report on Lawlessness 
in Law Enforcement, which documented and condemned illegal police 
behavior and offered some concrete recommendations to end it.89 
The failure of the Wickersham Commission to provide a satisfactory 
response to the problem of Prohibition is readily explained.  The 
controversy over the attempt to prohibit the manufacture, sale and 
consumption of alcohol was a political problem, rather than a technical 
one, which could be addressed through adjustments to the existing 
machinery of justice.  The latter approach represented the basic 
orientation of all of Hoover’s many commissions and conferences and 
the crime commissions of the 1920s.  The Prohibition controversy, 
however, was of a different order altogether, representing a deep social 
and cultural divide over the place of alcohol in society that touched on 
deep-seated values.  It can be usefully seen as another chapter in the 
long-running “culture wars” that mark American history.90 There were 
 
84. See, e.g., THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 69, at xxii–xxvi, 815–1087, 1092–
1100 (providing a lengthy treatment of organized crime). 
85. CALDER, supra note 1, at 85–87 (labeling the problem as the “Prohibition 
Albatross”). 
86. PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 83, at 83. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 84. 
89. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 340–47 (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS] (providing several conclusions and recommendations).  
90. See generally JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO 
DEFINE AMERICA (1991); IRENE TAVISS THOMSON, CULTURE WARS AND ENDURING 
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no adjustments that would resolve the issue of Prohibition, however.  A 
solution required confronting the values underlying it as social policy in 
the first place. 
2. The Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 
The only other Wickersham Commission report to gain any public 
attention upon release, and the only other one to be out of step with the 
orientation of the remaining reports, was the Report on Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement.91  In blunt and provocative language, the report 
declared that “the third degree—that is, the use of physical brutality, or 
other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or 
admissions—is widespread.”92 The abuses included “[p]rotracted 
questioning,” “[t]hreats” and “intimidation,” “[p]hysical brutality,” 
“illegal detention,” denial of access to counsel, and delay in producing a 
prisoner before a magistrate.93  Local officials were unashamed about 
their methods.  The Commissioner of Police in Buffalo said “[i]f I have 
to violate the Constitution or my oath of office, I’ll violate the 
Constitution.”94  Beatings of suspects were widespread across the 
country.95  A suspect in Cleveland was forced to lie naked on the floor 
and then lifted several times by his sex organs.96  The Detroit police used 
a practice called “around the loop,” which involved moving arrestees 
from one of the fifteen precinct stations to another to keep him from 
family, friends, and legal representation.97 
The existence of the third degree was well known among local 
criminal justice officials, and at least some other members of the general 
public,98 but the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement was the first 
time an authoritative government body had ever recognized and 
condemned it in print, with thorough documentation, gathered through 
field research and a national review of relevant court cases.99 
 
AMERICAN DILEMMAS (2010).   
91. See REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89. 
92. Id. at 4. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 102–03. 
95. Id. passim. 
96. Id. at 118. 
97. Id. at 121. 
98. The third degree had been a public controversy early in the twentieth century.  
WALKER, supra note 66, at 125–26, 132–34. 
99. Methods of the investigation are described in REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 
89, at 22–24.   
15 WALKER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:11 AM 
1182 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1165 
The report concluded with an evident attempt at balance by 
summarizing the “excuses” and “evils” of the third degree.100  The 
excuses included that it “is necessary to get at the facts,” and “is used 
only against the guilty”; that various “obstacles . . . make it almost 
impossible to obtain convictions” any other way; that it is “inevitable 
and . . . an excusable reaction to the brutality of criminals”; that 
restricting the third degree would “impair the morale of the police”; and 
that organized crime “renders traditional legal limitations outworn.”101 
The evils, meanwhile, included that the third degree creates the “danger 
of false confession”; that it “impairs police efficiency” by discouraging 
professional police practices; that it impairs the efficiency of the courts; 
and finally that it “brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner,” and 
lowers public confidence in the criminal justice system.102 
The report recommended some significant changes in criminal 
procedure, some of which anticipated changes in the law by several 
decades, although it is not clear how they would address the third 
degree problem directly.  The recommendations included establishing 
legal representation for defendants “in all cases” (which the Supreme 
Court would not require until the 1960s), requiring the prosecution to 
provide the defense with a list of its witnesses, eliminating race 
discrimination in jury lists (an issue that would wait until the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s), simplifying and clarifying the law on the 
admissibility of evidence, and others.103  The recommendation to end 
race discrimination in jury lists, it might be noted, was one of only two 
occasions where a Wickersham Commission report addressed 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origins (the other 
being the Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the 
United States, discussed below).104  Earlier observations in the report, 
however, undercut the likely effectiveness of the recommended changes 
in criminal procedure with respect to the enormous problem of police 
lawlessness.  Changing the law of criminal procedure, it had previously 
argued, would have only minimal impact because officials either do not 
enforce existing law or deliberately disobey it.  “Statutes can not [sic] 
 
100. Id. at 173. 
101. Id. at 174–80. 
102. Id. at 180–90. 
103. See id. at 341–43. 
104. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) [hereinafter 
REPORT ON DEPORTATION]. 
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cope with the third degree nor can police regulations.  Without the will 
to enforce them, these become words upon a printed page.  The real 
remedy lies in the will of the community.”105  For this problem, however, 
the Wickersham Commission report had no recommendation. 
Other Wickersham Commission reports also noted the overriding 
importance of public attitudes, meaning specifically serious problems in 
the administration of justice.  This was most evident in the Report on 
Prohibition, which noted the pervasive violation of the law and 
indifference to enforcement abuses.106  The Report on Crime and the 
Foreign Born, meanwhile, noted the persistent public belief that 
immigrants committed crime at a disproportionate rate compared with 
native-born Americans, despite evidence to the contrary.107  Citing 
public opinion as the fundamental problem was essentially a fatalistic 
conclusion, an admission that they had no immediate, practical reforms 
to recommend, and that they had no real answer to the question of how 
to change public attitudes.108 
The Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement stands out among 
the various Wickersham reports because of its explosive conclusions and 
its civil liberties orientation.  No other report so bluntly accused public 
officials of pervasive wrongdoing.  Other reports blamed problems on 
unqualified personnel, the influence of “politics,” or sheer public 
indifference.  There is, in fact, some mystery surrounding how the 
Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement was initiated and how its 
three co-authors were selected in the first place. 
Co-author Walter Pollak was the ACLU’s premier Supreme Court 
litigator in the 1920s and 1930s,109 arguing several landmark cases that 
marked the beginnings of the revolution in the law of individual rights.  
Most important, he argued Gitlow v. New York (1925), where the Court 
established the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the First Amendment.110 He also argued two Scottsboro cases, notably 
 
105. REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89, at 191. 
106. PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 83, at 22. 
107. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIME 
AND THE FOREIGN BORN 23, 195 (1931) [hereinafter CRIME AND FOREIGN BORN]. 
108. See id. at 195–96 (concluding and recommending that the Commission failed to 
suggest ways to attempt to sway public opinion). 
109. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE 
ACLU 79, 81–82 (1990).  See generally Louis H. Pollak, Advocating Civil Liberties: A Young 
Lawyer Before the Old Court, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
110. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).   
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Powell v. Alabama (1932) where the Court held that Powell, facing a 
possible death penalty, had been denied due process of law because he 
had not had legal representation.111  The Scottsboro affair, where nine 
young African-American men were accused of raping two white women 
near the small Alabama town of that name, and which involved 
numerous court proceedings over many years, became a national cause 
célèbre in the 1930s, and arguably the first great national civil rights 
case.112  In addition to extending the principle of incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Scottsboro cases 
marked the Court’s growing attention to issues of racial justice.  Co-
author Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law School was the reigning 
authority on freedom of speech, based on his 1919 law review article and 
1920 book on freedom of speech in wartime.113  His views played a major 
role in shaping public opinion and the course of constitutional law in the 
direction of greater protection of freedom of speech in the years 
between the first and second world wars.  He was also one of twelve 
prominent attorneys (including Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound) 
who co-authored the report Illegal Practices of the United States 
Department of Justice, a stinging critique of the famous “Palmer Raids” 
of late 1919 and early 1920, where federal authorities arrested hundreds 
of alleged radicals.114  Given the background and concerns of its authors, 
one could easily predict what kind of report they would write.  No other 
Wickersham Commission report nor any of the crime commission 
reports of the 1920s involved the civil liberties perspective of the Report 
on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement.  The surviving documents do not 
help to explain how these three individuals were selected for the 
report.115  The most likely explanation for the origins of the Report on 
Lawlesness in Law Enforcement was the fact that Chafee was a Harvard 
 
111. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
112. See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH (1969). 
113. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).  Professor Chafee also wrote 
another book on free speech in 1941.  See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1941). 
114. NAT’L POPULAR GOV’T LEAGUE, REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3–4 (1920); WALKER, supra note 109, at 44–
45 (arguing that the report had a significant impact on public opinion, particularly as it served 
as a valuable documentation of abuses associated with the Red Scare for future generations).  
Carl Stern, the third co-author, was a civil libertarian attorney, although not as well-known as 
the other two.   
115. The Papers of the Wickersham Commission provide no help on this question. 
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Law School colleague of Roscoe Pound, the intellectual guiding force 
behind the Wickersham Commission, and also that Felix Frankfurter, a 
major figure in the crime commission movement and a founding 
member of the ACLU.116 
The nature of the lawlessness study did provoke some controversy 
within the Wickersham Commission, with some commissioners arguing 
over whether to continue it or publish a final report.  Oddly, some 
evidence suggests that Commission Chairperson George W. 
Wickersham was not fully aware of what the report really involved.117  
Some commissioners adamantly objected to the entire enterprise and 
wanted the Commission not to publish any part of it.118  Nonetheless, the 
report survived with its explosive evidence intact. 
The report arrived at a propitious moment in the history of police 
reform.  In the 1930s, a new generation of reform police chiefs was 
coming to the fore and began taking the police professionalization 
movement to a new level.119  The leader of this movement was O.W. 
Wilson.  He began writing on the subject of police administration in the 
mid-1930s.120  His book Police Administration, first published in 1950,121 
eventually became the unofficial “bible” on the subject and shaped 
police thinking through the 1970s.  To be sure, the Wickersham Report 
on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement hardly ended police misconduct.  
Police brutality erupted into a national controversy in the 1960s122 and 
misconduct continues today.  But for the reform-minded police chiefs 
who emerged in the 1930s, the report served as a valuable point of 
reference and support. 
The Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement (the report 
discussing the use of the third degree) completely overshadowed the 
 
116. WALKER, supra note 109, at 44–45, 66; see Harvard Law School Deans Throughout 
History, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/classroom/rela
ted/hls-deans.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013.).  
117. See CALDER, supra note 1, at 97. 
118. Id. at 96–97 (discussing this controversy). 
119. See generally WALKER, supra note 66, at 53–54, 56–57. 
120. See WILLIAM J. BOPP, “O.W.”: O.W. WILSON AND THE SEARCH FOR A POLICE 
PROFESSION 152 (1977); WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 1, at 172. 
121. O.W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1st ed. 1950).  Throughout the years 
several versions of the book were released.  See, e.g., O.W. WILSON, POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1963); O.W. WILSON & ROY CLINTON MCLAREN, POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1972).   
122. WALKER, supra note 66, at 132–33. 
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modest Report on Police,123 written by August Vollmer, then near the 
end of his career as the leader of the first era of the police 
professionalization movement.124  It closely resembled other police 
investigations of the 1920s, including the relevant chapters of the various 
crime commissions, and reiterated what had developed as the standard 
prescription for police professionalization: the elimination of “politics,” 
the hiring of experienced managers as police chiefs, and the 
improvement of police officer recruitment and training standards.125 
3. The Report on Prosecution and the Administration of Criminal 
Justice as a System 
The curious aspect of the Report on Prosecution is the contrast 
between the 38-page report itself and the 298 pages of supplemental 
“Criminal Justice Surveys and Analysis,” which includes a still-useful 
104-page bibliography on studies of the administration of justice.  The 
supplemental report was written by Alfred Bettman who had previously 
written the chapter on prosecution for the pioneering survey.126  Most 
important, the supplemental materials included a discussion of the 
interrelationships among criminal justice agencies, which was grounded 
in the analysis of the “Mortality Statistics” of criminal cases as they 
proceeded from arrest through final disposition.127  The mortality issue 
had been first noted but not analyzed by the Cleveland Survey.128  The 
Wickersham Report found “strik[ing]” the number of ways “a 
prosecution may be terminated,” which included a “large number of 
different steps or stages” in the criminal process.129  It also noted the 
“interrelationships between the various parts of the administration of 
criminal cases and their reflex effects upon each other.”130  Although the 
authors of the report did not fully understand the significance of what 
they had found, they had in fact stumbled upon a phenomenon that 
 
123. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE 
(1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON POLICE]. 
124. WALKER, supra note 1, at 154. 
125. REPORT ON POLICE, supra note 123, at 140; WALKER, supra note 66, at 70–71, 129–
30. 
126. See REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at v.  The chapter on prosecution is 
in FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at xii–xiii (showing the Chapter on Prosecution, written by 
Alfred Bettman, beginning on page eighty-five in the Table of Contents). 
127. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 52–53. 
128. See FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at 89–96.   
129. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 55.   
130. Id. at 58. 
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thirty-six years later the President’s Crime Commission would identify 
as the “systems” model of the administration of justice.131  As discussed 
later in this Article, the systems model would dominate professional 
thinking about criminal justice, making the phrase “criminal justice 
system” commonplace, and would shape research and policy making in 
the field from that time to the present.132  It is interesting to speculate on 
the course of criminal justice studies, and the subsequent impact on 
policy, had the work of the Wickersham Commission, and the Report on 
Prosecution, in particular, not been short-circuited by the Great 
Depression.  Had the systems approach to the administration of justice 
been developed in the 1930s, it is quite possible that the research and 
reform efforts that emerged in the 1960s might have been advanced by 
decades. 
The recommendations of the Report on Prosecution were a mixture 
of modest proposals that were similar to those of previous crime 
commissions and some very far-reaching proposals.  In the conventional 
mode, the report recommended the “[e]limination . . . of political 
considerations” in the selection and appointment of federal prosecutors; 
the better “selection and tenure of [state] prosecutors”; and 
improvements in the “organization of the legal profession” in order to 
provide a higher quality of criminal justice personnel.133  The report also 
recommended the “systematized control of prosecutions in each State 
under a director of public prosecutions,” which was clearly a strategy for 
eliminating what was considered improper local political influence on 
the justice system.134  The fifth and last recommendation was more far 
reaching than the others, calling for the “[p]rovision for legal 
interrogation of accused persons under suitable safeguards.”135  With its 
attention to the deprivation of individual rights, the recommendation 
paralleled the attention to civil liberties in both the Wickersham Report 
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and the Report on the Enforcement 
of the Deportation Laws of the United States.136  
 
131. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 53–67 (1967) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY]. 
132. See id.; infra Part VI.  
133. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 37–38. 
134. Id. at 38. 
135. Id. 
136. Compare id. 37–38, with REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89, at 340–47, and 
REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 133–49. 
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4. The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the 
United States 
The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the 
United States resembles the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 
in its concern for the deprivation of individual rights of defendants.137  In 
general, the report is a fairly strong indictment of the deportation 
process.  The “[o]bjectionable [f]eatures” of the process involved the 
“[i]nvasion of [p]ersonal [r]ights,”138 which included illegal searches and 
seizures, inquisitorial examinations, the lack of representation by legal 
counsel (which it labeled “[o]ne of the most striking features” of the 
process),139 the “despotic powers” of the administrative agency, and 
other related problems.140 
The causes of the abuses in the deportation process, the report 
argued, included the low social status of most of the suspects as foreign-
born immigrants and public indifference to personal rights in general, 
and for low status people in particular.141  It took special note of the 
impact of the deportation process on the families of suspects and 
deportees, and called for exceptions in cases of hardship.142  Such 
concern for the plight of the powerless was expressed only in the 
Wickersham Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.  Additionally, 
the report expressed concern for deportees whose “lives may be in 
danger because of their political opinions” if they were returned to their 
native lands, and recommended that they should be allowed to go to a 
different country at their own expense.143  Concern about the status of 
immigrants and associated civil liberties issues was rare in the political 
atmosphere of the 1920s, a decade marked by the notoriously 
discriminatory “national origins” quota system of the 1924 Immigration 
Act.144 
The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the 
United States’s Conclusions and Recommendations were mixed.  On the 
 
137. See REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 133–49.    
138. See id. at 133. 
139. Id. at 135, 137–38, 143. 
140. See id. at 144–49. 
141. See id. at 154–55. 
142. Id. at 128–30, 179. 
143. Id. at 179.  
144. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860–1925 (1955) (providing the classic account of American Nativism 
for the time period). 
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one hand, it declared that vigorous enforcement of existing deportation 
laws was “necessary” in order “to rid the country of undesirable 
residents unlawfully here” and it was necessary to strengthen agencies to 
prevent unlawful entry.145  Nonetheless, the “apprehension and 
examination” of suspects was “often characterized by methods 
unconstitutional, tyrranic [sic], and oppressive,” which resulted in some 
people being wrongfully deported.146  It added that there had not been a 
“proper study” of the deportation process, and it suggested the need for 
“public findings” that would build up “a consistent body of 
administrative law.”147 
The recommendations of the Report on the Enforcement of the 
Deportation Laws of the United States addressed some of the problems it 
had identified.  Most important the report called for separating the 
functions of investigation and prosecution of deportation cases and the 
creation of an independent tribunal for hearings.148  Separating the 
functions was needed because the agency sits in “judgment on the cases 
which itself has prosecuted.”149  More far reaching was the 
recommendation regarding the lack of competent counsel for 
defendants.  To remedy this, the report recommended utilizing legal aid 
societies to provide attorneys for criminal defendants.150  The idea of 
legal aid for the poor was still relatively new in the United States and 
only a few cities had even minimal programs, so implementation of the 
recommendation was uncertain at best.  Nonetheless, this was a bold 
idea at a time when the requirement of legal representation for all 
felony defendants in criminal cases was three decades in the future. 
5. Other Wickersham Reports 
The other Wickersham Commission reports were a mixed bag.  The 
most influential over the long term was Volume Two of the Report on 
the Causes of Crime,151 which devoted nearly 400 pages to the work of 
criminologists Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay on “Social Factors in 
 
145. REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 177, 179.   
146. Id. at 177. 
147. Id. at 177–78. 
148. See id. at 178. 
148. See id.  
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 179. 
151. See 2 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE 
CAUSES OF CRIME (1931) [hereinafter 2 CAUSES OF CRIME]. 
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Juvenile Delinquency.”152  The authority of the Commission gave Shaw 
and McKay’s approach to the study of crime considerable validity, and 
the study of social factors and crime eventually dominated the field of 
academic criminology, eclipsing physiological and psychological 
approaches.  Shaw and McKay argued that the impact of various social 
factors resulted in “social disorganization,” which included peer group 
influence and the failure of the immediate community in high crime 
neighborhoods as an agency of social control.153  By the time of the 
President’s Crime Commission in 1967, the sociological approach was 
virtually unchallenged.154 
Volume I of the Report on the Causes of Crime reinforced Volume 
II, concluding that “social influences” represented the “soundest data” 
on criminal behavior.155  Volume I is notable for shying away from one 
of its own insights about criminal behavior in America.  It noted the 
problem that a large volume of “crime” involved behavior that many 
people regarded as legitimate private recreation that had been 
criminalized.  The most important, of course, involved drinking 
alcoholic beverages and gambling.156  The result was an over-burdened 
criminal justice system, which impeded effective response to more 
serious crimes about which there was a broad social consensus.  This 
problem would draw attention in the 1960s, when it was labeled the 
“[c]risis of [o]ver-criminalization,”157 and attention was given to 
decriminalizing alcohol-related and mental health-related behaviors.  
Recognition of this problem by the Report on the Causes of Crime, in 
short, was decades ahead of its times. 
Also influential over the long term was the Report on Penal 
Institutions: Probation and Parole for its strong endorsement of these 
institutions, and its principles of the indeterminate sentence and 
individualized sentences that underlay them.158  These practices had 
 
152. See id. at ix. 
153. Id. at 387, 390–91. 
154. See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 131; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 5–6 
(1967) [hereinafter CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].   
155. 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE 
CAUSES OF CRIME 139 (1931) [hereinafter 1 CAUSES OF CRIME]. 
156. See id. at 12–13.  
157. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967).  
158. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PENAL 
INSTITUTIONS: PROBATION AND PAROLE 172 (1931) [hereinafter PENAL INSTITUTIONS].  
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become nearly universal in the United States by the 1920s, but 
authorities were still in the process of developing a set of professional 
practices.159  The Wickersham Commission endorsement was reinforced 
by the 1939–1940 Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures,160 
and by the mid-1960s these practices had become virtually unquestioned 
as the proper approach to criminal sentencing and the release of 
offenders.161 
The Report on the Cost of Crime was an ambitious effort that 
concluded that the “ultimate economic cost of crime to the 
community . . . can not [sic] be ascertained.”162  It added that it was also 
not possible to determine the cost of crime to individual victims.163  The 
Report on Crime and Foreign Born, meanwhile, reached the politically 
unpopular conclusion that immigrants actually committed fewer crimes 
than native-born Americans.164  It noted that the idea that immigrants 
were responsible for a high proportion of the crime in America had 
prevailed since the earliest days of the United States.165  The conclusion 
was particularly courageous because the 1920s were a time of strong 
anti-immigrant feelings, marked by the 1924 Immigration Act, which 
imposed a notorious national origins quota system that discriminated 
against southern and eastern Europeans.166 
The Report on Criminal Procedure167 and the Progress Report on the 
Study of the Federal Courts168 were particularly disappointing.  The 
Report on Criminal Procedure ignored issues that were dramatically 
 
159. See id.  The report actually consisted of two separate documents, the formal Report 
on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole and an equally long (about 170 pages long) Report 
of the Advisory Committee on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole.  See id. at v–vi. 
160. See 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939). 
161. See CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 154, at 141–46.  In the late 1960s, 
however, the indeterminate sentence and parole would come under sharp attack by both 
conservatives and liberals, and these attacks would spark a vigorous debate over criminal 
sentencing in the 1970s that led to the adoption of sentencing guidelines as the most popular 
alternative.  See WALKER, supra note 1, at 218–19. 
162. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE COST 
OF CRIME 69 (1931) [hereinafter COST OF CRIME]. 
163. Id.  
164. CRIME AND FOREIGN BORN, supra note 107, at 195. 
165. Id. at 23. 
166. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 144 (discussing discrimination at that time).  
167. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. 
168. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, PROGRESS 
REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1931) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS]. 
15 WALKER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:11 AM 
1192 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1165 
raised by the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and, consistent 
with the Report on Prosecution, confined its recommendations to 
changing public and professional attitudes on the selection of judges and 
improving the quality of the lower criminal courts.  The Report on 
Criminal Procedure did include some thoughtful suggestions on 
alternatives to formal arrest procedures, including citations, 
administrative adjustment, and summons169—ideas that became popular 
in the 1960s.  The Report on the Study of Federal Courts was officially a 
“Progress Report” and consists of data from an ambitious study of case 
processing in the federal system, but with no findings or conclusions.170 
VI. AFTER WICKERSHAM: SUBSEQUENT CRIME COMMISSIONS 
The Depression and World War II prevented the recommendations 
of the Wickersham Commission from having much immediate impact on 
public policy.  The reports on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement; the 
Causes of Crime; and Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole had a 
significant, long-term impact in shaping developments in their respective 
fields—although it is difficult to assess the process of that impact.  There 
were two national-level events on crime policy in the 1930s, though only 
one should be seen as a follow-up to the Wickersham Commission.  The 
1934 Attorney General’s Conference on Crime focused entirely on 
crime control, in response to fears of a national crime wave,171 and gave 
no attention to the reform of criminal justice agencies, which was the 
focus of many of the Wickersham Commission reports.172  The now 
largely forgotten Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures 
(1939–1940) was a direct follow-up to the Wickersham Commission, 
focusing on sentencing, probation, and parole.173  Reiterating the 
Wickersham Commission’s endorsement of these practices, it furthered 
the work of the Wickersham Commission in establishing a national 
consensus on those practices.  More significant with respect to the 
administration of justice was the American Bar Foundation (ABF) 
Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States 
(1953–1969).  This privately sponsored effort conducted pioneering field 
 
169. See REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 167, at 46–47 (1931). 
170. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 168, at iii, v.   
171. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 
(1936) [hereinafter CONFERENCE ON CRIME]; WALKER, supra note 1, at 157–58. 
172. See CONFERENCE ON CRIME, supra note 171. 
173. See id. at XV–XVII. 
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research on policing, prosecution, and sentencing.174  It was particularly 
influential in identifying the issue of police discretion, including all of its 
attendant problems, and the practice of plea bargaining.  The survey’s 
reports were delayed, but at least two, Arrest175 (addressing police 
discretion) and Conviction176 (examining plea bargaining), immediately 
became classic works on their respective subjects.177  Most important, the 
ABF survey field research discovered the many social, legal, and 
organizational factors that affect decision making in the administration 
of justice.  In that respect, the ABF survey picked up the tentative 
insights of the crime commissions of the 1920s and the Wickersham 
Commission about the causes of the “mortality” of criminal cases and 
explored them more fully.   
The 1965–1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Criminal Justice, popularly known as the President’s 
Crime Commission, was the true follow-up to the Wickersham 
Commission, as an attempt to survey the entire administration of 
justice.178  It proved to be the transformative event in the history of 
American criminal justice, with ramifications that continue to influence 
the research, policy, and both professional and public understanding of 
the subject.  The Commission’s final report, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society,179 and the accompanying nine Task Force Reports, 
Research Studies and Consultant’s Papers, brought unprecedented 
public and professional attention to the issues of crime and criminal 
justice, and was accompanied by the first significant infusion of federal 
financial assistance to criminal justice.  The Commission sponsored 
 
174. Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The 
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 54 (1992). 
175. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY 63–82 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965). 
176. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR 
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 49, 68 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966). 
177. See Walker, supra note 174, at 49 (“Arrest is universally regarded as a classic.”).  
The results of the ABF survey were published in a five volume series.  See ROBERT O. 
DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF 
SENTENCE  (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969); LAFAVE, supra note 175; FRANK W. MILLER, 
PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (Frank J. Remington 
ed., 1970); NEWMAN, supra note 176; LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME: 
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND 
ENTRAPEMENT (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967). 
178. See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Foreword to CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 
154. 
179. CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 154. 
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pioneering field research, the most important of which resulted in 
scholarly books and articles by Albert J. Reiss and Donald Black180 that 
continue to influence police research.  The Commission’s work also 
marked the advent of federal funding for, and in that respect gave a 
powerful and lasting boost to, social science research on criminal justice.  
A decade later, one could say that a genuine “research revolution” was 
under way, and it continued unabated in the following decades.181 
The most important contribution of the President’s Crime 
Commission was the Task Force Report: Science and Technology, which 
followed up on the Wickersham Commission’s Report on Prosecution’s 
tentative insights into the interrelationships of the various justice 
agencies and the many ways a criminal case could exit the process.  It 
formulated a comprehensive model of the administration of justice and 
gave birth to the concept of a “criminal justice system,” which 
immediately became commonplace.  The Task Force’s graphic model of 
the system appeared in virtually every text on criminal justice.  The 
“systems” approach continues to guide research and policy making to 
this day, focusing attention on the overall functioning of the system, the 
various exit points for criminal cases, and the discretionary decisions 
each one involves.182  As noted earlier, the impact of the systems model 
has been so profound and lasting that one cannot avoid speculating on 
how the course of American criminal justice might have been different 
had circumstances permitted serious pursuit of the Wickersham’s initial 
insights in the decade of the 1930s. 
The Task Force Report: Science and Technology gives no evidence, 
however, of an influence of the Wickersham Commission’s earlier work.  
Nor is there any evidence in the other volumes of any reference to the 
specific work of its predecessor.  The indeterminate sentence, the 
principle of individualized sentences, probation, and parole had become 
so thoroughly institutionalized over the intervening three decades that 
there was evidently no perceived need to look back to one of the 
 
180. See DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE, xi–xii  (1980) 
(basing the study on original field research); ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC x–xi (1971) (basing the study on original field research); see also SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 131, at 7–10 (providing the factors related to clearing crimes by 
arrest).  The larger study inspired by the Task Force’s report is PETER W. GREENWOOD ET 
AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1977). 
181. See WALKER, supra note 1, at 206; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 20–21 (Wesley Skogan & 
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004). 
182. Walker, supra note 174, at 71–72. 
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milestones in their development.  Field studies of the police sponsored 
by the President’s Commission did explore the dynamics of police-
citizen interactions and produced the first quantitative data on police 
use of force and excessive force.  In this respect, the Wickersham Report 
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement did have some indirect influence.  
In general, though, it is safe to conclude that the Wickersham 
Commission had little direct influence on the later and more important 
national crime commission. 
VII. A BRIEF NOTE ON HERBERT HOOVER’S POST-PRESIDENTIAL 
YEARS 
Herbert Hoover’s post-presidential years are relevant to his Article 
in one respect only: the so-called Hoover Commission.183  Hoover spent 
the last three decades of his life as the grand old man of the Republican 
Party, the living embodiment of pre-Franklin D. Roosevelt and pre-New 
Deal America.  He strongly opposed the vast expansion of the size and 
scope of the federal government and its involvement in virtually every 
phase of American life, and as a result he projected a public image of 
conservatism that was not representative of his career as a public 
servant.184  Bitter over the criticisms of his “failure” as President, he 
contributed to the near-complete eclipse of his pre-war record as a 
moderate and progressive Republican.185 
Hoover’s one notable public activity in his post-presidential years 
was chairing the Hoover Commission.  Congress created the 
Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of Government in 
1947 and President Harry Truman appointed Hoover to chair it.186  With 
a list of luminaries as members of the Commission, a large staff the 
Commission published nineteen reports with 273 separate 
recommendations.187  It completed its work in June 1949, and Congress 
 
183. See generally REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra 
note 7, at v; GARY DEAN BEST, HERBERT HOOVER: THE POSTPRESIDENTIAL YEARS 1933–
1964 (1983); BURNER, supra note 10, at 336–37. 
184. BEST, supra note 183, at xv–xvi . 
185. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 209–31.  Hoover’s reputation was also permanently 
stained by his order for the army to roust the Bonus Army in the summer of 1932.  DONALD 
J. LISIO, THE PRESIDENT AND PROTEST: HOOVER, MACARTHUR, AND THE BONUS RIOT 
297–98 (2nd ed. 1994).  Although hardly representative of his public career, he bears direct 
responsibility for the unnecessary tragedy.  Id. 
186. BEST, supra note 183, at 312. 
187. Id. at 327.  See generally REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH, supra note 7. 
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passed the Government Reorganization Act that year.188  The 
Commission was a fitting coda to Hoover’s career as a public servant, as 
it embodied his commitment to address an important social problem 
through the careful gathering of facts.  In this instance the problem was 
the enormous expansion of the Executive Branch as a result of the New 
Deal and World War II, and in keeping with his previous commission 
efforts, he did not challenge the institutions under review but sought 
only to make them more efficient.  The Commission was so highly 
regarded that his name became the standard shorthand term for it 
(“Hoover Commission”).  Some Republicans hoped that the Hoover 
Commission would scale back the power of the Executive Branch, but 
they were sorely disappointed.189  In fact, some observers argue that the 
Commission only strengthened the Executive Branch by helping to 
make it more efficient.190  The Hoover Commission’s work was honored 
by imitation.  Congress created a second Hoover Commission in 1955, 
with the then 80-year-old Hoover as its chair.191  The state of California, 
meanwhile, created a “‘Little Hoover Commission” that was eventually 
transformed into a permanent government body to study its various 
government agencies that continues today.192 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Herbert Hoover’s career as a public servant began with fifteen years 
of enormous success and then ended with a disaster that was beyond his 
control and, which for the remaining thirty-one years of his life, 
overshadowed all of his previous accomplishments.  Hoover was 
arguably the most competent executive ever to serve as President of the 
United States, with a clear vision of moderate social reform.  Far from 
being a narrow pro-business adherent of laissez-faire doctrine, as 
popular stereotypes hold, he was concerned about a broad range of 
 
188. BEST, supra note 183, at 409. 
189. See BURNER, supra note 10, at 337. 
190. Id. at 336–37; see Peri E. Arnold, The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial 
Presidency, 38 J. POL. 46, 70 (1976). 
191. Hoover himself estimated that 72% of the first Hoover Commission 
recommendations were adopted during the Truman Administration, compared with 64% of 
the second commission’s recommendations under the Eisenhower Administration.  HOFF 
WILSON, supra note 6, at 225. 
192. The Milton Marks Commission on California State Government Organization and 
Economy was created in 1962 and refers to itself at the “Little Hoover Commission.”  About 
Us, LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2013). 
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social and economic problems.  To all of them he brought his training as 
an engineer and a commitment to the gathering and analysis of facts that 
would guide moderate, practical reforms.  The Wickersham 
Commission, the first national study of crime and criminal justice, was a 
natural expression of his approach to the improvement of American life. 
Largely because of the tragedy of the Great Depression that 
descended on the country within months after Hoover became 
President, the Wickersham Commission has largely disappeared from 
history.  It is mainly remembered for its Report on Prohibition, which 
refused to call for repeal of the experiment in outlawing alcoholic 
beverages.  The neglect of the Commission is unfortunate, however, 
because it has important relevance for understanding both Hoover’s 
public career and the history of American criminal justice.  With respect 
to Hoover’s public career, because the Wickersham Commission is 
consistent with his approach to addressing social problems, it helps to 
illuminate his long overshadowed efforts and accomplishments apart 
from the Great Depression.  And in that regard, it helps restore his 
reputation as a moderate progressive reformer.  With respect to the 
history of American criminal justice, the Wickersham Commission was 
an important link between the vigorous crime commission movement of 
the 1920s and subsequent studies of the American criminal justice 
system.  Two Wickersham Commission reports, the Report on 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and the Report on the Enforcement of 
the Deportation Laws of the United States, touched on issues of due 
process and equal protection, which would become major controversies 
in the 1960s.  Two other reports, the Report on the Causes of Crime and 
the Report on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole, gave a strong 
boost to ideas and practices that became unchallenged in American 
criminal justice.  A third report, the Report on Prosecution, tentatively 
identified but did not pursue phenomena that would later become part 
of the accepted model of the criminal justice system.  In the end, both 
Herbert Hoover and the Wickersham Commission deserve better fates 
at the hands of historians and criminal justice scholars. 
 
